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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Worms and malware pose an increasing risk to today’s networks. The growing
sophistication of today’s systems has greatly increased the speed and damage poten-
tial of such attacks. To stop worms and malware, first you must know about them.
In today’s rapidly evolving networks, where attackers are often one step ahead of the
products designed to thwart them, anomaly detection is an important innovation.
Many vendors rely on signature detection to find network-borne threats. Customers
often have to wait days to get a working signature for a new worm, leaving their
networks vulnerable in the most critical period during a worm’s release. Network
behavior analysis is one of the most robust and scalable security technologies. At
the core of network behavior analysis are anomaly-based algorithms used to identify
emerging threats.
Network anomalies can arise due to various causes, some of which are network
overload, malicious Denial of Service attacks, and network intrusions that somehow
disrupt the normal delivery of network services. Typically, each of these disrupt the
normal behavior of some network data. Normal network behavior is dependent on
several factors such as dynamics of the network in terms of volume of traffic, type
of data and the types of applications. Commercially available network management
systems monitor a set of data to detect anomalies. Typically, a human network
manager observes the alarm conditions to determine the status of the network. These
conditions represent deviation from normal network behavior and can possibly occur
during an anomalous event. This can result in degradation of performance in the
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network. Thus, an anomaly can be associated with abrupt changes in the measured
data, the duration of which varies with the nature of the anomaly. This is where
anomaly detection finds application.
Anomaly detection is basically described as an alarm for strange system behavior.
Dorothy Denning describes in her paper - An Intrusion Detection Model, a model for
building an ”activity profile” of normal usage over an interval of time. Once done,
the profile can be compared against the present state in real time. Anything that
deviates from the baseline, or the norm, is logged as anomalous. Anomaly Detection
Systems are quite different from Intrusion Detection Systems although essentially
both look for suspicious behavior. Finally, the result is the same - a suspicious event is
flagged and sent to the administrator. IDS systems are analogous to Misuse Detection
systems wherein there is a predefined set of rules or filters crafted to detect a specific,
malicious event. However, an ADS operates only from the baseline of benign activity.
The differences are there for all to see. An IDS is designed to catch events that are
on its list. Anything outside this list will not be recognized. In contrast, an ADS can
detect new, unknown and unlisted events. Figure 1.1 shows different types of IDS
depending on the different techniques and characteristics.
Network anomalies can be broadly classified into two types.
1. Network failures : E.g. A web server could fail if there is an increase in the
number of requests to the server.
2. Security Related: E.g. Denial of Service attacks and Network intrusions.
The main objective of the thesis is to show that multiple anomaly detection al-
gorithms can be implemented in parallel to effectively characterize the type of traffic
causing the abnormal behavior. The logs are obtained by running six anomaly de-
tection algorithms in parallel on the Network Processor. The six Anomaly Detection
Algorithms used to identify aberrant behavior in the network are:
2
Figure 1.1. Intrusion Detection Systems
1. Holt Winter based Forecasting model proposed by Brutlag J.D. [4] which cap-
tures the history of the network traffic variations and predicts the future traffic
rate in the form of a confidence band.
2. Behavior-based anomaly detection method proposed by Yu Gu [20] et al. that
detects network anomalies by comparing the current network traffic against a
baseline distribution.
3. Adaptive Threshold Algorithm [17], a straightforward and simple algorithm
that detects anomalies based on violations of a threshold that is adaptively set
based on recent traffic measurements.
4. Cumulative Sum Algorithm, [11], a proven statistical algorithm that maintains
the cumulative sum of the deviations from a reference value, which is usually
the mean of the time process.
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5. Averaging Algorithm [16], another straightforward and simple algorithm that
mainly averages the past 60 values. This is taken to be the predicted value
which is compared to the present observed value.
6. Exponentially Weighted Moving Average, which applies weighting factors that
decrease exponentially. Thus the most recent observations are given a greater
weightage than the older observations.
4
CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
A variety of tools have been developed for the purpose of network anomaly de-
tection. Some detect anomalies by matching the traffic pattern or the packets using
a set of predefined rules that describe characteristics of the anomalies. Examples of
this include many of the rules or policies used in Snort [1] and Bro [12]. The cost
of applying these approaches is proportional to the size of the rule set as well as the
complexity of the individual rules, which affects the scalability of these approaches.
Furthermore they are not sensitive to anomalies that have not been previously de-
fined. Our work is a behavior based approach and requires little computation. Deri
et al [9] show that in every network there are some global variables that can be
profitably used for detecting network anomalies, regardless of the type of users and
equipment. The main idea is the design of an IDS that uses both Signature based
and Anomaly based detection. Barford et al. [3] use wavelet analysis to remove from
the traffic the predictable ambient part and then study the variations in the network
traffic rate. Network anomalies are detected by applying a threshold to a deviation
score computed from the analysis. Thottan and Ji [18] take management information
base (MIB) data collected from routers as time series data and use an auto-regressive
process to model the process. Network anomalies are detected by inspecting abrupt
changes in the statistics of the data. Wang et al. [19] take the difference in the num-
ber of SYNs and FINs (RSTs) collected within one sampling period as time series
data and use a nonparametric Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) method to detect SYN
flooding by detecting the change point of the time series. [5] implements two of
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the algorithms -Entropy and Holt Winter in parallel and online to know more about
the types of anomalies generated and narrow down the traffic that is causing those
anomalies. Zhang et al [2], describe the use of Change Point monitoring to detect
Denial of Service Attacks. The objective of Change-Point Detection is to determine
if the observed time series is statistically homogeneous, and if not, to find the point
in time when the change happens. Non-parametric CUSUM is again used for the
detection of DoS attacks. Zou et al [6], introduce a methodology for fast detection
of internet worms called ”trend detection”. Its based on the fact that a worm, in an
early stage, propagates exponentially with a constant, positive exponential rate. The
system attempts to detect this trend.
6
CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM DESIGN
3.1 Motivation for online passive measurement
Measurements are important for managing and understanding computer networks.
Measurements can provide insight into correct and faulty network behavior, and pro-
vide us with a basis for traffic and performance modeling. Measurement and mon-
itoring tools are widely deployed in the Internet infrastructure. There are various
approaches to monitor the network, two of the most common being passive and ac-
tive measurement.
3.2 Passive Measurement
The passive approach uses devices to watch the traffic as it passes by. These are
special purpose devices such as a Sniffer, or OCxMon, or they can be built into other
devices such as routers, switches or end node hosts. The passive measurement devices
are polled periodically and information is collected to assess network performance and
status. One thing to note here is that this approach does not increase the traffic on the
network for the measurements. It is also extremely useful in network troubleshooting,
but is rather limited when it comes to emulating error scenarios or isolating the exact
fault location. There are potentially two ways of deploying a passive measurement
node.
1. Offline. In this method all the packets seen on the link are archived and then
post-processed by running the application on the trace.
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2. Online. In this method the packets are processed on transit and required statis-
tics are collected/updated on a per packet basis.
The choice of going for an online or offline passive measurement node depends
on several factors. Offline measurements create large traces that need to be post
processed to get the required statistics.As link speeds increase, this only aggravates
the problem. Also it is very processing intensive and time consuming to go through
such big traces and extract the required statistics. Besides, Intrusion Detection ap-
plications like detecting DoS attack, anomaly detection etc., are online by nature and
cannot be implemented in offline mode.
3.3 Active Measurement
The active approach essentially injects test packets into the network or sends pack-
ets to servers and applications, and measures the service obtained from the network.
Thus, it creates extra traffic, the parameters being artificial. The volume and other
parameters of the traffic are fully adjustable, thus providing explicit control on the
generation of packets for measurement scenarios. Thus various parameters such as
sampling techniques, timing, frequency, scheduling, packet sizes and protocols, sta-
tistical quality etcetera are under user control. Thus, active monitoring allows one to
test what one wants, and when one needs it.
In this work, we consider measurement and monitoring to be passive and online.
i.e., results are obtained by passively observing user traffic rather than by actively
injecting probing traffic. The following statistics are monitored dynamically:
• Traffic Rate
• Number of TCP packets per second
• Number of UDP packets per second
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• Number of TCP-Syn packets
• Number of TCP-Rst packets
• Number of Non-TCP and Non-UDP packets
• Targeted Ports divided into classes
3.4 Motivation for parallel implementation
Any DS, either based on signature detection or anomaly detection, is essentially
a burglar alarm system for the network. It enables us to monitor the network for
intrusive activities. When the intrusion occurs, the system generates an alarm to let
us know that the network is possibly under attack. However, the DS can generate
”false positives” or ”false alarms”.
A false positive occurs when the DS generates an alarm from normal user activ-
ity. If the system generates too many false positives, consequently there will be low
confidence in the capability of the DS to protect the network. This can result in
a ”the boy that cried wolf” syndrome: When an actual attack is afoot, no one will
respond because of all the previous false positives. Thus, it is important to minimize
the number of false positives that a DS generates. For instance, consider a DS system
that generates a large number of alerts (say 15000). Also, lets say the number of false
alarms is large as well, in thousands. Consequently, we find that this translates to
the manual filtering and analyzing of the generated alerts. Thus, the administrator:
loses confidence in the reliability of the DS, is overloaded with the task to manually
analyze each alert, and might lower the defence levels to reduce the number of false
positives. Tuning the DS can solve some of the False Positives problem, but tuning
is not the solution. We believe that FPs occur when the DS registers the legitimate
sampled traffic as an attack. Thus, there is a need to confirm that an attack is taking
place before an alert is raised.
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Earlier, we briefly explained the different parameters that will be monitored in
order to detect an anomaly. Thus, we will be looking at different parts of the traffic
and running each of the six anomaly detection algorithms on them. For example,
consider a DDoS attack on a Web Server through syn flooding. We have five anomaly
detection algorithms viz. Holt Winter[4], Adaptive Threshold[17], CUSUM[11], Av-
eraging and EWMA algorithms looking at syn packets among others. Concurrently,
we have the Entropy based [20] AD system looking at the various ports including port
80. Consequently, in case of the above attack, there will be an increase in the number
of syn packets targeting port 80, and all the algorithms monitoring the number of
syn packets and the target port will fire an alert on the type of traffic, tcp and syn in
this case, and the port, port 80 in this case. Thus, we can pinpoint the exact type of
traffic that is causing the anomaly and the target port on the system.
The main goal of a network IDS is to guide the analyst or administrator toward
network events that are malicious. The two major approaches as discussed above are
misuse detection - based on pattern matching, and anomaly detection. The short-
comings of the former are false positives, false negatives, variants and overload. Fur-
thermore, the signature based systems cannot detect new forms of attack. Anomaly
detection is the solution to the problem of detecting new attacks, as they rely on
traffic analysis rather than pattern matching to detect potential anomalies. Figure
3.1 illustrates our model of the ADS.
10
Figure 3.1. Anomaly Detection Model. Entropy only monitors ports
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CHAPTER 4
THE ONLINE PASSIVE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM
4.1 Passive Measurement Node Architecture
For the experimentation and testing, the Network Processor-Based Network Mea-
surement Node [14, 15, 13, 5] is being used. It is a passive measurement system which
is capable of capturing packet traces and pre-processing them online on the measure-
ment node. It is designed such that the statistics are updated dynamically during
runtime. The system, shown in Figure 4.1, is currently installed on the Internet access
link at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
4.1.1 Description
The Network processor based Network Measurement Node performs the following
functions:
1. Packet capture and Header parsing Each of the packets is parsed to determine
the sequence of headers present allowing us to consider nested protocol headers
as well as different header sizes
2. Anonymization IP addresses are anonymized online during trace collection to
protect the privacy of users.
3. Online Queries and Statistics Collection Packet preprocessing is done on the
measurement node itself. Packets containing meta-data are prepared and pushed
onto the central collection system over UDP.
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Figure 4.1. IXP2400 Based Network Measurement Node Architecture.
4.2 Implementation
The implementation is based on the IXP2400 [7] network processor found in the
Radisys ENP2611 [8] card. The IXP2400 has eight microengines that are highly
optimized for packet processing in the data plane, each in turn having eight threads
with zero overhead context swap. The XScale processor performs all the control plane
related tasks. The implementation architecture is shown in Figure 4.2
The measurement path is separated from the fast path. The fast path is respon-
sible for any packet processing function done by the router. The system has three
ports - Port 0, Port 1 and Port 2. Ports 0 and 1 handle normal traffic along the
fast path. The fast path simply forwards packets from Port 0 to 1 and vice versa.
The packet is then enqueued in the measurement path. The packet is dropped if the
queue is full. The measurement path consists of three microengines. The first per-
forms a filtering operation based on the query. This microengine corresponds to the
IP address and anonymization stages where the packet headers are also parsed and
collected, and IP addresses are anonymized. The second microengine corresponds to
metrics and statistics collection stage and performs measurement related processing
and collects statistics. The statistics collected include packet counts for individual
protocols, namely IP, TCP, UDP, etc and distributions of layer 3 protocols, packet
13
Figure 4.2. Measurement Node on the IXP 2400 NP.
size and the TCP port numbers. A ”measurement packet” is generated for every
packet that enters the measurement path. This packet contains a trace of the packet
headers and some meta data. This is done by the third microengine. The meta data
and captured headers are stored as a payload of an UDP over IP over Ethernet packet
occupying 42 bytes in toto (14 bytes for Ethernet, 20 bytes for IP and 8 bytes for
UDP).The format of the measurement packet is shown in Figure 4.3.
The meta data consists of the following:
1. Node ID: An identifier for the capture node that generated this measurement
packet.
2. Measure Length: Stores the total length of the captured headers.
3. Flags: Stores the input interface number of the packet on the link that was
measured.
4. Sequence Number: A sequence number is necessary to detect any packet loss
in the network. This is because of the use of UDP to transmit the measurement
traffic.
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Figure 4.3. Measurement Packet.
5. Timestamp (High and Low): Allows correlation of traffic between nodes.
The DOME runs NTP to achieve clock accuracy in the millisecond range. The
two fields store a 64-bit timestamp
In this architecture, four of the eight microengines are used to handle I/O and do
some pre-measurement tasks. This leaves us with four microengines to do the actual
application processing. Thus it is possible to build applications on top of it. The
anomaly detection algorithms are programmed in one of the remaining microengines.
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CHAPTER 5
ANOMALY DETECTION
Worms and malware pose an increasing risk toward today’s networks. The grow-
ing sophistication of today’s systems has greatly increased the speed and damage
potential of such attacks. In today’s rapidly evolving networks, where attackers are
often one step ahead of the products designed to thwart them, anomaly detection is
an important innovation. Many vendors rely on signature detection to find network-
borne threats. Customers often have to wait days to get a working signature for
a new worm, leaving their networks vulnerable in the most critical period during
a worm’s release.Network behavior analysis is one of the most robust and scalable
security technologies. At the core of network behavior analysis are anomaly-based al-
gorithms used to identify emerging threats. Basically there are three types of anomaly
detection algorithms:
• Protocol - packets that are too short or have ambiguous options or violate
specific application layer protocols.
• Rate-based - detects floods in traffic using a time-based model of normal traffic
volumes. Most useful for detecting denial-of-service attacks.
• Relational or behavioral - detects changes in how individual or groups of
hosts interact with one another on a network. For example, a normally quiet
host that starts connecting to hundreds of hosts per second on the SQL port
indicates a worm. Useful for a variety of threats, from worms and malware to
insider misuse.
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In addition, anomaly detection algorithms are also classified into:
• Statistical Anomaly Detection Algorithms - it determines ”normal” net-
work activity and then all traffic that falls outside the scope of normal is flagged
as anomalous (not normal). These systems attempt to learn network traffic pat-
terns on a particular network. This process of traffic analysis continues as long
as the system is active. Assuming network traffic patterns remain constant, the
longer the system is on the network, the more accurate it is.
• Specification Based Anomaly Detection Algorithms - this method uses
a logic-based description of expected behavior to construct a profile. Thus, an
administrator could construct a list similar to the rules and signatures. But
instead of looking for misuse, these rules would ignore normal usage. However,
anything outside of the specified behavior, would be marked as anomalous.
By applying these techniques, anomaly detection can identify zero-day worms, mal-
ware, and misuse.It also allows system administrators to separate the good from the
bad or suspicious traffic allowing them to take preemptive action. An anomaly detec-
tion system can potentially detect an attack the first time it is used. The intrusive
activity generates an alarm because it deviates from normal activity, not because
someone configured the system to look for a specific stream of traffic as is the case
with most intrusion detection systems.
However, the approach has three main drawbacks:
• It is too slow to detect fast spreading viruses and worms. The system is es-
pecially vulnerable during the training period where activity profiles are being
generated. Most networks are diverse and are constantly changing. Thus, there
is an added drawback. The ADS can be taught by intruders. For example,
an attacker can send numerous SYN scans targeted at the network by using a
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tool such as NMap.If continous, the system can flag this behavior as normal.
Similarly with flood pings.
• The system is susceptible to an enormous number of false positives. A false
positive occurs when the ADS generates an alarm from normal user activity.
Anomalies can occurs at any time. As the Anomaly detection systems are
looking for an anomalous event rather than an attack, it gives rise to the problem
of false positives.
• Mitigation techniques are marginally effective, if any. Action is usually through
zone segmentation to contain outbreaks.
One of the main motivations for this work is to resolve the problem of false pos-
itives and narrow down the traffic that is causing the anomaly. False positives are
mainly the reason why anomaly detection systems are not as prevalent when com-
pared to intrusion detection systems. In this thesis, we have tried to implement
six anomaly detection algorithms in parallel on the Passive Network Measurement
Node. This not only allows us to flag the possible anomalies in real time but then
also allows us to post process the data and classify and characterize the anomaly.
We have implemented the Holt Winter based forecasting model, Maximum Entropy
based Anomaly Detection Algorithm, Adaptive Threshold Algorithm, the Averaging
Algorithm, Cumulative Sum and the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average tech-
niques on the measurement node. Each of these implementations has been described
in the following sections.
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5.1 Holt Winter Based Forecasting
In this section the Holt Winter Forecasting Model for detecting aberrant behavior
detection given by Brutlag J.D [4] is explained. Many service network variable time
series exhibit the following regularities (characteristics) that should be accounted for
by a model:
• A trend over time (i.e., a gradual increase in application requests over a two
month period due to increased subscriber load).
• A seasonal trend or cycle (i.e., every day bytes per second increases in the
morning hours, peaks in the afternoon and declines late at night).
• Seasonal variability. (i.e., application requests fluctuate wildly minute by minute
during the peak hours of 4–8 p.m., but at 1 a.m. application requests hardly
vary at all).
• Gradual evolution of regularities (1) through (3) over time (i.e., the daily cycle
gradual shifts as the number of evening daylight hours increases from December
to June).
In addition to modeling time series regularities, model design must consider the
real-time monitoring context. Complicated statistical models are unlikely to be un-
derstood by network technicians and unlikely to be feasible computationally in a
real-time context.
Aberrant behavior detection is decomposed into three pieces, each building on its
predecessor:
• An algorithm for predicting the values of a time series one time step into the
future.
• A measure of deviation between the predicted values and the observed values.
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• A mechanism to decide if and when an observed value or sequence of observed
values is too deviant from the predicted value(s).
The proposed model is an extension of Holt-Winters Forecasting, which supports
incremental model updating via exponential smoothing. Let y1....yt−1, yt, yt+1.... de-
note the sequence of values for the time series observed at some fixed interval. Let
m denote the period of the seasonal trend (i.e., the number of observations per day).
Exponential smoothing is used to predict the next value. It is a simple algorithm
for predicting the next value in a time series given the current value and the current
prediction. Let yt+1 denote the predicted value for time t+ 1, then:
yˆt+1 = αyt + (1− α)yˆt (5.1)
The prediction is actually a weighted average of all past observations in the time series.
The premise of exponential smoothing is that the current value is most informative
for prediction of the next value, and that the weight of an older observation decays
exponentially as the observation moves further into the past. It is an incremental
algorithm because the next prediction is obtained by updating the current prediction
with the current observed value. α is the model parameter and 0 < α < 1. It
determines the rate of decay (1−α) and the weight the current value is given during
the incremental update.
Holt-Winters Forecasting is a more sophisticated algorithm that builds upon expo-
nential smoothing. Holt-Winters Forecasting rests on the premise that the observed
time series can be decomposed into three components: a baseline, a linear trend, and
a seasonal effect. The algorithm presumes each of these components evolves over time
and this is accomplished by applying exponential smoothing to incrementally update
the components.
The prediction is the sum of the three components: The update formulas for the
three components, or coefficients a, b, c are:
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• Baseline (“intercept”): at = α(yt − ct−m) + (1− α))(at−1 + bt−1)
• Linear Trend (“slope”): bt = β(at − at−1) + (1− β)bt−1
• Seasonal Trend: ct = γ(yt − at) + (1− γ)ct−m
As in exponential smoothing, the updated coefficient is an average of the prediction
and an estimate obtained solely from the observed value yt, with fractions determined
by a model parameter (α, β, γ). Suppose that m is the period of the seasonal cycle; so
the seasonal coefficient at time t references the last computed coefficient for the same
time point in the seasonal cycle. The new estimate of the baseline is the observed
value adjusted by the best available estimate of the seasonal coefficient (ct−m). As the
updated baseline needs to account for change due to the linear trend, the predicted
slope is added to the baseline coefficient. The new estimate of the slope is simply the
difference between the new and old baseline (as the time interval between observations
is fixed, it is not relevant). The new estimate of the seasonal component is the
difference between the observed value and the corresponding baseline.
The parameters α, β and γ are the adaptation parameters of the algorithm and
0 < α, β, γ < 1. Larger values mean the algorithm adapts faster and predictions re-
flect recent observations in the time series; smaller values means the algorithm adapts
slower, placing more weight on the past history of the time series. Note that the up-
date formulas imply that an implementation need only store the current values of
the slope and intercept, and a single period of seasonal coefficients, as these stored
values are replaced at each iteration. Holt-Winters Forecasting can also predict a
time series further than a single time step in the future. This multi-step prediction
provides a mechanism to handle missing data. Confidence bands measure deviation
for each time point in the seasonal cycle; this mechanism models seasonal variabil-
ity. The measure of deviation is a weighted average absolute deviation, updated via
exponential smoothing.
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dt = γ(yt − yˆt) + (1− γ)dt−m (5.2)
Here dt is the predicted deviation at time step t. The update formula for dt is
similar to that of ct. They even share the same adaption parameter, γ. The confidence
band is simply the collection of intervals (yˆt − δ− · dt−m, yˆt + δ+ · dt−m) for each time
point yt in the series.
Parameters δ+ and δ− are scaling factors for the width of the confidence band.
Often, a symmetric confidence band is desired and δ+ = δ−. In this case, denote the
common parameter δ. Given some assumptions and statistical distribution theory,
sensible values of are between 2 and 3.
A simple mechanism to detect an anomaly is to check if an observed value of the
time series falls outside the confidence band. However, this mechanism often yields a
high number of false positives. A more robust mechanism is to use a moving window
of a fixed number of observations. If the number of violations (observations that fall
outside the confidence band) exceeds a specified threshold, then trigger an alert for
aberrant behavior. Formally, define a violation as an observation yt that falls outside
the interval:
(yˆt − δ− · dt−m, yˆt + δ+ · dt−m) (5.3)
Finally, define a failure as exceeding a specified number of threshold violations
within a window of a specified number of observations (the window length).
At a cost of adding some additional overhead to the implementation, the model
performs temporal smoothing within a cycle for the seasonal coefficients and devia-
tions. The smoother used is an equal-weight moving average, with a window of 0.05m.
The model parameters need to be set and tuned for the model to work well. There is
no single optimal set of values, even restricted to data for a single variable. This is
due to the interplay between multiple parameters in the model.
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For example, consider two observations in sequence, yt and yt+1. The intercept (a),
slope (b), and seasonal (c) coefficients all ‘absorb’ some part of the difference between
yt and y(t + 1) during the exponential smoothing update. It is safe to assume some
of the difference is noise, so updates to the coefficients need not account for all of
the difference between yt and yt+1. The values of α, β and γ determine the relative
share of the difference assigned to a changing baseline, a changing linear trend, and
a changing seasonal coefficient.
Here are some guidelines for setting parameters:
1. Parameter α: At least one of α, β and γ should allow adaptation in a short time
frame. As seasonal updates occur infrequently for each coefficient (once per
cycle), and the goal of β is to capture a slowly changing linear trend, the most
logical choice is α. Use exponential smoothing weights to make an educated
choice for α. The sum of the most recent n weights is 1 − (1 − α)n and of
course the sum of all weights is 1 (ignoring initialization). These facts can be
manipulated to choose α using the formula:
α = 1− exp(ln(1− total weights as percentage)
number of points
) (5.4)
For example, if one wants observations in the last 15 seconds to account for 95
percent of the weights, and observations occur at one second intervals (fifteen
timepoints), then the formula yields α = 0.181.
2. Parameter β: As the purpose of β is to capture a linear trend longer than
one seasonal cycle, it is logical to choose β such that one seasonal cycle does
not account for a majority of the exponential smoothing weights. The formula
discussed previously applies with β replacing α. For example, if the period of
the cycle is twenty seconds, at one observation every second (20 time points),
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then setting β = 0.00346 will guarantee that observations within the last day
account for less than 50 percentage of the smoothing weights.
3. Parameter γ: The seasonal adaptation parameter can also be selected using
exponential smoothing weights using a variation of the previous formula. Note
this single parameter controls both seasonal coefficient and deviation adapta-
tion, on the assumption that seasonal trend and variability evolve together over
time at roughly the same rate.
4. Parameter δ: As noted in confidence bands section, the scaling factor of the
confidence bands can be chosen by appealing to statistical distribution theory.
Reasonable values fall in the interval [2, 3]. Choosing 2 detects more failures
(which may just mean a higher rate of false positives).
5. Window length and threshold: Given the goal of real-time monitoring, the
window length should be at most on the order of 20 seconds (i.e., for one second
intervals, choose a window length between 15 and 20). A higher threshold will
make the model robust to false positives, but perhaps at the cost of missing
true failures. These parameters are probably the most difficult to set a priori.
5.1.1 Implementation of Holt Winter Forecasting Model
The algorithm outlined above was implemented on the network processor setup
and run for an eight hour long interval. The microengine of the Network Processor
maintains various statistics of the packets seen in the link. The observed value for that
particular statistic is calculated every second. The next expected value is calculated
based on the Holt Winter Forecasting model. Confidence intervals are calculated as
described in the previous section, and a violation is indicated when the observed value
falls outside the confidence band. The results are shown in the Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3,
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Figure 5.2. Per second interval Anomalies for Holt Winter model
5.4, 5.5 for the Holt Winter model monitoring the traffic rate in Mbps. On the x-axis,
we have time in seconds.
• Per second observed and predicted rates according to the Holt Winter Forecast-
ing model is shown in Figure 5.1. On the y-axis, we have the rate in Mbps.
• Per second violations as shown in Figure 5.2. As is evident, there are a large
number of false positives.
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Figure 5.3. 20 second interval Observed and Predicted Rates for Holt Winter model
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Figure 5.5. Total number of threshold violations in the 20 second interval
• Figure 5.3 shows the 20 second averaged values of the observed and predicted
rates. On the y-axis we have the rate in Mbps.
• Figure 5.4 shows anomalies at instances where the number of violations in the
twenty second interval, as in Figure 5.5 exceeds the threshold value.
5.2 Maximum Entropy based Anomaly Detection
5.2.1 Description
The Maximum Entropy based Anomaly Detection scheme was proposed by Yu Gu
et al [20]. In this approach all the packets in the network traffic into a set of packet
classes. In order to study the distribution of these packets, they divide them into a set
of two-dimensional classes according to the protocol information and the destination
port number in the packet header. This set of packet classes is the common domain
of the probability spaces. In the first dimension, packets are divided into four classes
according to the protocol related information. First, packets are divided into the
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classes of TCP and UDP packets. Two other classes are further split from the TCP
packet class according to whether or not the packets are SYN and RST packets.
In the second dimension, packets are divided into 506 classes according to their
destination port numbers. Port numbers often determine the services related to the
packet exchange. According to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, port num-
bers are divided into three categories: Well Known Ports (0 – 1023), Registered Ports
(1024 – 49151), and Dynamic and/or Private Ports (49152 – 65535). Packets with a
destination port in the first category are divided into classes of 8 port numbers each.
Since packets with port number 80 comprise the majority of the network traffic, they
are separated into a single class. This produces 129 packet classes. Packets with des-
tination port in the second category are divided into 376 additional classes, with each
class covering 128 port numbers. Packets with destination port numbers larger than
49151 are grouped into a single class. Thus, in this dimension, packets are divided
into a total of 129 + 376 + 1 = 506 classes.
Altogether, the set of two-dimensional classes consists of 4 · 506 = 2024 packet
classes. These packet classes comprises the probability space. The distribution of
different packets in the benign traffic according to this classification, and use it as the
baseline distribution to detect network traffic anomalies.
Empirical distribution of the packets is obtained once every time slot based on
the percentage of packets seen in that class to the total packets seen. The relative
entropy shows the difference between the distribution of the packet classes in the
current network traffic and the baseline distribution. If this difference is too large,
it indicates that a portion of some packet classes that rarely appear in the training
data increases significantly, or that appear regularly decreases significantly, which
corresponds to an anomaly.
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5.2.2 Implementation
The packet counts in each class are obtained once every second. The packet count
in each class divided by the total packets seen in that time interval gives the empirical
distribution of that packet class. The relative entropy shows the difference between
the distribution of the packet classes in the current network traffic and the baseline
distribution. If this difference is too large, it indicates that a portion of some packet
classes that rarely appear in the training data increases significantly, or that appear
regularly decreases significantly. In other words, this serves as an indication of the
presence of an anomaly in the network traffic..
5.3 Adaptive Threshold Algorithm
5.3.1 Description
The Adaptive Thresholding Algorithm [17] is a straightforward and simple algo-
rithm. It detects anomalies based on violations of a threshold that is adaptively set
based on recent traffic measurements. Seasonal variations and trends are taken care
of by using an adaptive threshold whose value is set based on an estimate of the mean
number of the packets under consideration or the rate, either of which are computed
from recent traffic measurements. If xn is the observed value in the n-th time inter-
val, and µ¯n−1 is the mean estimated from measurements prior to n, then the alarm
condition is
If xn ≥ (α+ 1)µ¯n−1, then Alarm signalled at time n. (5.5)
where α > 0 is a parameter that indicates the percentage above the mean value that
we consider to be an indication of anomalous behavior. The mean µ¯n can also be
computed over some past time window or using an Exponentially Weighted Moving
Average of the previous measurements as given below.
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µ¯n = βµ¯n − 1 + (1− β)xn (5.6)
where β is the EWMA factor.
If we apply the above algorithm directly, then it is obvious that it will yield a
high number of false positives. To counter this, we can trigger an alarm only after
a minimum number of consecutive violations of the threshold. Thus, the new alarm
condition is given by
If
n∑
i=n−k+1
1xn≥(α+1)µ¯n−1 ≥ k, then Alarm at time n. (5.7)
where k > 1 indicates the number of consecutive intervals the threshold must be
violated for an alarm to be raised.
The tuning parameters of the adaptive threshold algorithm are the amplitude
factor α for computing the alarm threshold, the number of successive threshold vio-
lations k before signalling an alarm, the EWMA factor β, and the length of the time
interval over which traffic measurements (number of individual packets and the rate)
are taken. The following values were considered for the parameters α = 0.5, k = 5,
and β = 0.98. The results are shown in the Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9. On the x-axis,
we have time in seconds.
• Per second observed and predicted rates according to the Adaptive Threshold
algorithm is shown in Figure 5.6. On the y-axis, we have the rate in Mbps.
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Figure 5.9. Total number of threshold violations in the 20 second interval
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• Per second violations as shown in Figure 5.7. As is evident, there are a large
number of false positives.
• Figure 5.8 shows anomalies at instances where the number of violations in the
twenty second interval, as in Figure 5.9 exceeds the threshold value.
5.4 Cumulative Sum Algorithm
5.4.1 Description
The CUSUM technique is a sequential technique for detecting change points. Data
is input to the algorithm one point at a time decision on whether a change point has
occurred is made as each new piece of data is received. As its name suggests, CUSUM
maintains a cumulative sum of deviations from a reference, µ , which is the mean of the
process estimated in real time and periodically updated. If xn is the n-th observation,
and Si is the i-th cumulative sum, the cumulative sum, Si can be calculated as follows:
Sk =
k∑
i=1
(x1 − µ) = (xk − µ) + Sk−1 (5.8)
If the observations xn are close to the mean, then the cumulative sums Si will
be around zero. However, once a shift around the mean occurs, the Si values will
increase or decrease quickly. In the above equations, we have mentioned µ to be the
mean value. µ can be calculated as an Exponentially Weighted Moving Average of
the previous observations as given below
µn = βµn − 1 + (1− β)xn (5.9)
where β is the EWMA factor. Choose a parameter δ that is the upper bound of µ.
Also, define
S˜n = Sn − δ (5.10)
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S˜n has a negative mean during normal operation. However, when an attack occurs,
S˜n will suddenly become a large positive. Also, let the increase in the mean of S˜n be
lower bounded by a value h.
Let yn = (yn−1 + S˜n)+ (5.11)
where
x+ =

x if x > 0
0 else
and yn is defined as:
yn = Un − min
1≤k≤n
Uk (5.12)
and where
Uk =
k∑
i=1
S˜k and U0 = 0 (5.13)
Thus, yn is nothing but the maximum continuous increment until time n. A large yn
is a strong indication of an attack. Now, let dN(·) be the decision at time n: 0 for
normal operation and 1 for an attack. Let N be the flooding threshold. Then, we have
dN(yn) =

0 if yn ≤ N
1 if yn > N
The effect of introducing δ is to offset the possible positive mean in Xn, so that yn
will be reset to zero frequently and will not accumulate in time.
5.5 Average over past n prediction
The average over past n algorithm is a simplified version of the Adaptive threshold
algorithm. Here, the seasonal variations are accounted for by taking the average of
32
0
10
20
30
40
60
80
100
110
120
130
140
150
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000 22000
M
bp
s
Observed
Expected
Figure 5.10. Per second Observed and Predicted Rates for Averaging Algorithm
the past n values. Thus, if xn is the observed value in the n-th time interval, and µ¯n
is the mean estimated from measurements prior to n, then the alarm condition is:
If xn ≥ µ¯n, Alarm at time n. (5.14)
Again, it can be seen that this technique is susceptible to a high number of false
positives if directly applied. Thus, we choose a window period over which we keep
a count of the number of violations. An alarm is raised only when the number of
violations over this window exceeds the threshold value set for that window. Thus,
the new condition is
If
t∑
i=0
1xn≥µ¯n ≥ k, then Alarm at time n. (5.15)
where t is the window period in seconds, and k > 0 is the minimum number of
threshold violations that should be registered within the window period for the alarm
to signal. The results are shown in the Figures 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13. On the x-axis,
we have time in seconds.
• Per second observed and predicted rates according to the Averaging model is
shown in Figure 5.10. On the y-axis, we have the rate in Mbps.
• Per second violations as shown in Figure 5.11. As is evident, there are a large
number of false positives.
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Figure 5.13. Total number of threshold violations in the 20 second interval
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• Figure 5.12 shows anomalies at instances where the number of violations in the
twenty second interval, as in Figure 5.13 exceeds the threshold value.
5.6 Exponentially Weighted Moving Average
An exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) applies weighting factors
which decrease exponentially. The weighting for each older data point decreases
exponentially, giving much more importance to recent observations while still not
discarding older observations entirely. The graph at right shows an example of the
weight decrease. The degree of weighing decrease is expressed as a constant smoothing
factor β, a number between 0 and 1. β may be expressed as a percentage, so a
smoothing factor of 10% is equivalent to β = 0.1. The equation that defines the
EWMA is
µ¯n = βµ¯n − 1 + (1− β)xn (5.16)
where µ¯n is the exponentially weighted moving average of the past measurements.
5.7 Parallel implementation of Anomaly detection schemes
on the IXP2400
Earlier, I briefly explained the different parameters that will be monitored in
order to detect an anomaly. Thus, we will be looking at different parts of the traffic
and running each of the six anomaly detection algorithms on them. For example,
consider a DDoS attack on a Web Server through syn flooding. We have four anomaly
detection algorithms viz. Holt Winter, Adaptive Threshold, CUSUM, Averaging and
Next=Current prediction looking at syn packets among others. Concurrently, we
have the Entropy based AD system looking at the various ports including port 80.
Consequently, in case of the above attack, there will be an increase in the number
of syn packets targeting port 80, and all the algorithms monitoring the number of
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syn packets and the target port will fire an alert on the type of traffic, tcp and syn
in this case, and the port, port 80 in this case. Thus, we can pinpoint the exact
type of traffic that is causing the anomaly and the target port on the system. Thus,
we can see that there is a need of a correlation engine. Essentially, a single data
point often results in an alarm. However, a correlation engine looks at multiple data
points. A network anomaly, is not enough evidence to initiate an immediate response.
Once it correlates with an alert from the other algorithms over the sampling period,
can the alarm be issued with a high degree of accuracy. This results in fast and
accurate detection which can also initiate stoppage of attack traffic, as is typically
done, without negatively impacting critical operations.
5.7.1 Implementation details
To have a better understanding of the algorithms and for experimentation we
needed to recreate the traffic. Consequently, the six anomaly detection algorithms
were run on a Lab setup on publicly available traces the details of which are given in
detail in the following section. The lab setup consisted of a host machine with the
ENP2611 card installed in it, and a replay machine which replayed the stored pcap
traces. Tcpreplay was used to replay the traces over the network. Tcpreplay is aimed
at testing the performance of a Network Intrusion Detection System by replaying
real background network traffic in which to hide attacks. Tcpreplay allows you to
control the speed at which the traffic is replayed, and can replay arbitrary libpcap
traces. Unlike programmatically-generated artificial traffic which doesn’t exercise
the application/protocol inspection that a NIDS performs, and doesn’t reproduce
the real-world anomalies that appear on production networks (asymmetric routes,
traffic bursts/lulls, fragmentation, retransmissions, etc.), tcpreplay allows for exact
replication of real traffic seen on real networks.
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5.7.2 Anomaly Trees
The basic premise of all the algorithms explained in the previous section is that a
violation or an anomaly is registered when the observed value is too deviant from the
calculated or predicted value for that time instant. Our technique uses this fact thus
only concentrating on the degree by which an the observed value deviates from the
prediction as calculated by an algorithm. All six algorithms monitor each subset of
traffic. This not only enables us to pinpoint the exact subset of traffic that is causing
the anomaly but also to come up with a simple score that characterizes the degree of
the anomaly. For this purpose, we create what we call the Anomaly Tree for every
time instance.
The Anomaly tree (Fig. 5.14) represents a hierarchical relationship between the
various subsets of traffic as observed in the network. At the highest level is the traffic
as seen in the network. A level below are the TCP, UDP and Other (Non-TCP and
Non-UDP) traffic. TCP is further divided into TCP-Syn, TCP-Rst and TCP(Rest)1.
UDP, TCP-Syn, TCP-Rst and TCP(Rest) are further divided into 506 classes each
according to the Entropy algorithm [20] explained earlier.
The Anomaly tree is updated every time instance, and maintains the score for
every subset of traffic calculated from the algorithm outputs. Every algorithm outputs
values depicting the degree of deviation on a different scale. This necessitates the use
of normalization techinques so as to enable us to compare all algorithm outputs on
a similar scale. Of various normalization techniques available, we chose Min-max
normalization. Min-max normalization subtracts the minimum value of an attribute
from each value of the attribute and then divides the difference by the range of the
attribute. These new values are multiplied by the new range of the attribute and
1TCP(Rest) is the Non-Syn and Non-Rst TCP traffic
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Figure 5.14. Anomaly Tree
finally added to the new minimum value of the attribute. These operations transform
the data into a new range, generally [0,1].
Every node maintains the current normalized degree as output by the various
algorithms. To ensure that we do not end up with six trees for every time instance
for the six algorithms in parallel, but instead we only have one tree per time instance,
the nodes maintain either the Average or theMedian of the six outputs at every node.
The observed statistics and the differences between maintaining the Average and the
Median are explained in the following section.
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CHAPTER 6
OBSERVATIONS
The algorithms were run on four different traces with different characeristics and
varied attack traffic. This section explains in detail the observations for each of those
traces along with the status of the Anomaly tree nodes at selected time instances
during the experiment. The experiments are repeated for the Median and the Average
case.
6.1 Trace 1
The trace was taken from the peering link at the Los Nettos network of the
University of Southern California, LA, USA. The trace contains Syn portscan and
portsweep traffic of varying magnitudes between 50 and 250 seconds into the trace.
The entire trace lasts for about 441 seconds. The trace was repetitively replayed a
number of times using tcpreplay.
6.1.1 Average of the Normalized Algorithm outputs
The experiment was carried out with the nodes updating the average of the nor-
malized algorithm outputs at every time instance. The graphs of the node values ver-
sus time are shown in the Figure. 6.2. The experiment shows a correlation between
the algorithm outputs and the behavior of the traffic in the trace. The aggregation
model is successful in detecting the syn traffic in the trace between time instants 50
and 250 seconds and also outputs a rough metric of how deviant the observations are.
The behavior of various algorithms as seen at the Syn node in the anomaly tree is
shows in Figure. 6.1.
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Figure 6.1. Output behavior of Algorithms as seen at the Syn node in the Anomaly
Tree.
6.1.2 Median of the Normalized Algorithm outputs
The experiment was carried out with the nodes updating the median of the nor-
malized algorithm outputs at every time instance. The graphs of the node values
versus time are shown in the Figure. 6.3
6.1.3 Anomaly Tree
Figure 6.4 shows the status of the anomaly tree nodes before and after the change
at three sets of instances. An increase in the normalized output of the algorithms as
seen at a particular indicates that the node is anomalous. The anomalous nodes are
shaded in with a darker shade representing a higher level of anomaly. For instance,
at times 898s(before) and 903s(after the change), the Syn node value increases by 0.4
units whereas UDP node value increases by 0.1 unit. Thus, Syn node is shown in a
darker shade as compared to the UDP node.
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Figure 6.2. Trace 1: Average of the Algorithm outputs at various Anomaly tree
nodes.
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Figure 6.3. Trace 1: Median of the Algorithm outputs at various Anomaly tree
nodes.
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Before Change After Change
Figure 6.4. Trace 1: Anomaly Tree nodes at various instants of time
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6.2 Trace 2
Trace 2 is actually a series of Code Red worm traces scripted to replay one after
the other using tcpreplay. The total duration of the traces is 816.64 seconds including
the background trace which does not contain the worm traffic.
6.2.1 Average of the Normalized Algorithm outputs
The experiment was carried out with the nodes updating the average of the nor-
malized algorithm outputs at every time instance. The graphs of the node values
versus time are shown in the Figure. 6.6. The CodeRed trace shows a large change in
TCP, TCP-Syn and TCP-Rst traffic as seen in the Fig. 6.6. This was also observed
in the manual reading of the trace where at instances after 220s into the trace a
large amount of TCP traffic is seen. The behavior of the various algorithms at the
anomalous nodes as seen in the Average Anomaly Tree is shown in Fig. 6.5.
6.2.2 Median of the Normalized Algorithm outputs
The experiment was carried out with the nodes updating the median of the nor-
malized algorithm outputs at every time instance. The graphs of the node values
versus time are shown in the Figure. 6.7
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Figure 6.5. Trace 2: Output behavior of Algorithms as seen at the Syn, Rst, TCP
and UDP nodes in the Anomaly Tree respectively.
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Figure 6.6. Trace 2: Average of the Algorithm outputs at various Anomaly tree
nodes.
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Figure 6.7. Trace 2 :Median of the Algorithm outputs at various Anomaly tree
nodes.
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Before Change After Change
Figure 6.8. Trace 2: Anomaly Tree nodes at various instants of time
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6.3 Trace 3
Trace 3 is a Distributed DoS attack trace from the DARPA 2000 Intrusion De-
tection evaluation carried out at MIT Lincoln labs. It includes a distributed denial
of service attack run by an stealthy attacker. This attack scenario is carried out
over multiple network and audit sessions. These sessions have been grouped into 5
attack phases, over the course of which the attacker probes the network, breaks in to
a host by exploiting the Solaris sadmind vulnerability, installs trojan mstream DDoS
software, and launches a DDoS attack at an off-site server from the compromised
host.
6.3.1 Average of the Normalized Algorithm outputs
The experiment was carried out with the nodes updating the average of the nor-
malized algorithm outputs at every time instance. The graphs of the node values
versus time are shown in the Figure. 6.10. We observe large deviations in the Syn,
TCP(rest), Rst and UDP plots. The algorithm behaviors for the affected nodes are
shown in Figure. 6.9.
6.3.2 Median of the Normalized Algorithm outputs
The experiment was carried out with the nodes updating the median of the nor-
malized algorithm outputs at every time instance. The graphs of the node values
versus time are shown in the Figure. 6.11
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Figure 6.9. Trace 3: Output behavior of Algorithms as seen at the Syn, Rst, TCP
and UDP nodes in the Anomaly Tree respectively.
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Figure 6.10. Trace 3: Average of the Algorithm outputs at various Anomaly tree
nodes.
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Figure 6.11. Trace 3: Median of the Algorithm outputs at various Anomaly tree
nodes.
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Before Change After Change
Figure 6.12. Trace 3: Anomaly Tree nodes at various instants of time
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6.4 Trace 4
The trace was taken from the peering link at the Los Nettos network of the
University of Southern California, LA, USA. The trace contains Syn portscan and
portsweep traffic over a period of 900 seconds. A lot of zero-byte UDP packets are
also observed in the trace. The trace was repetitively replayed a number of times
using tcpreplay.
6.4.1 Average of the Normalized Algorithm outputs
The experiment was carried out with the nodes updating the average of the nor-
malized algorithm outputs at every time instance. The graphs of the node values
versus time are shown in the Figure. 6.14. The output behavior of the algorithms is
shown in the Figures 6.13.
6.4.2 Median of the Normalized Algorithm outputs
The experiment was carried out with the nodes updating the median of the nor-
malized algorithm outputs at every time instance. The graphs of the node values
versus time are shown in the Figure. 6.15
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Figure 6.13. Trace 4: Output behavior of Algorithms as seen at the Syn, Rst, TCP
and UDP nodes in the Anomaly Tree respectively.
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Figure 6.14. Trace 4: Average of the Algorithm outputs at various Anomaly tree
nodes.
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Figure 6.15. Trace 4: Median of the Algorithm outputs at various Anomaly tree
nodes.
53
Before Change After Change
Figure 6.16. Trace 4: Anomaly Tree nodes at various instants of time
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6.5 Anomaly Tree - Relationship between Anomalous and
Non-Anomalous Nodes
The Anomaly tree represents a hierarchical relationship between the various sub-
sets of traffic as observed in the network. At the highest level is the traffic as seen in
the network. A level below are the TCP, UDP and Other (Non-TCP and Non-UDP)
traffic. TCP is further divided into TCP-Syn, TCP-Rst and TCP(Rest)1. UDP, TCP-
Syn, TCP-Rst and TCP(Rest) are further divided into 506 classes each according to
the Entropy algorithm [20] explained earlier.
6.5.0.1 Detecting Anomalies
This hierarchical structure enables us to pinpoint the exact type of traffic causing
the anomaly. At every time instance, the Anomaly tree updates the scores of the
nodes as output by the alogithms. These scores are nothing but the Average or the
Median of the normalized deviations as output by the algorithms. Normalization is
used so as to enable us to compare and operate on the outputs of the algorithms on a
similar timescale For example, in the case where there is a TCP-Syn portscan on port
80 occurring in the network, the Anomaly tree will register a high value at the TCP-
Syn node. Further, Class 128 under Syn will also register a high value. However,
one thing to note is that the parent node of TCP-Syn, TCP, might or might not
register a high value depending on whether the total volume of traffic as seen among
all its children increases or not. Thus, if there is an increase in the number of Syn
packets but there is a proportionate decrease in the number of Rst packets, the TCP
parent node will not register an anomaly. Thus, it becomes important to consider the
parent-child relationship between nodes when characterizing the anomaly.
The Anomaly tree is also successful in registering multiple anomalies occurring
in the system .For example, in Figure 6.16 , for the instances of 793s and 794s, the
1TCP(Rest) is the Non-Syn and Non-Rst TCP traffic
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Anomaly tree is able to successfully register a TCP-Syn Portscan on Class 128 2 and
a UDP Flood attack occurring on various ports 3.
2Port 80 [20]
3The TCP-Syn and UDP children are not shown because of the large number of children, 506 in
each case
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
!
In this work, I have implemented six Anomaly Detection algorithms in parallerl
on a Network Processor based passive measurement node. The algorithms are:
1. Holt Winter based Forecasting model proposed by Brutlag J.D. [4] which cap-
tures the history of the network traffic variations and predicts the future traffic
rate in the form of a confidence band.
2. Behavior-based anomaly detection method proposed by Yu Gu [20] et al. that
detects network anomalies by comparing the current network traffic against a
baseline distribution.
3. Adaptive Threshold Algorithm [17], a straightforward and simple algorithm
that detects anomalies based on violations of a threshold that is adaptively set
based on recent traffic measurements.
4. Cumulative Sum Algorithm, [11], a proven statistical algorithm that maintains
the cumulative sum of the deviations from a reference value, which is usually
the mean of the time process.
5. Averaging Algorithm [16], another straightforward and simple algorithm that
mainly averages the past 60 values. This is taken to be the predicted value
which is compared to the present observed value.
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6. Exponentially Weighted Moving Average, which applies weighting factors that
decrease exponentially. Thus the most recent observations are given a greater
weightage than the older observations.
The outputs of these algorithms were normalized and used to derive a common
score of the state of the traffic each of those algorithms were monitoring. The state
was constantly updated using an Anomaly tree, which maintains and updates the
scores at various nodes which represent differenct subsets of traffic. Experiments
were carried out on four different publicly available traces containing attack as well
as background traffic. The Anomaly trees successfully registered an anomaly for the
differnet cases at particular time instances. This was verified by physically inspecting
the trace.
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CHAPTER 8
FUTURE WORK
8.1 Collaborative Decisions and Feedback
The objective of parallel implementation is to successfully characterize anomalies
and possibly reduce number of false positives that Anomaly Detection Systems are so
susceptible to. We have six algorithms looking at different parts of the traffic. A more
sophisticated method would be to design a correlation engine that takes into account
the characteristics of not only the traffic, but also of each of these algorithms. The
correlation engine can be designed to take into account the Total volume of traffic that
is causing the anomaly, the Specific type of traffic, and the Intensity of the attack.
Thus, we can use three new parameters:
1. Intensity : Defined by the number of packets involved in the attack during the
monitoring cycle. E.g. Increasing number of Syn packets as found in Syn
flooding attacks.
2. Volume: The parameter that is concerned with the total traffic viz. rate, total
number of packets etcetera.
3. Specificity : Defined by the target of attack viz. port, protocol used, type of
packets etcetera
Once we have the necessary information on the offending traffic, it can be selectively
blocked and/or traces can be collected for later inspection, without affecting the
performance as perceived by legitimate users. This constitutes the feedback to the
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Anomaly Detection System, wherein the system is made autonomous by including a
feedback to the passive measurement/capture node, thus enabling it to make intelli-
gent decisions about whether to block the offending traffic and/or capture traces for
further inspection.
Another problem is of a distributed measurement system which incorporate inde-
pendent anomaly detection systems. These systems can have an ability to collaborate
amongst each other to make intelligent decisions dynamically about the network traf-
fic policies. Besides, the different systems can be divided in an independent manner
thus enabling us to selectively block zombies (infected machines as in DoS attacks)
which are a part of that particular subnet being monitored.
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